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DPJ Government and Climate Change Policy
In 2009 election manifesto Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leaders voiced their 
decisive support for stronger engagement in international climate negotiations. 
The promises were realized by an ambitious climate mitigation proposal present-
ed by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio at COP 15 in Copenhagen. 25% CO2 levels 
reduction commitment was heavily criticized by Japanese opposition, METI bu-
reaucrats and business circles. Despite strong domestic opposition Prime Minis-
ter Hatoyama decided to place climate mitigation among priorities of his foreign 
policy. Next DPJ administration quickly backtracked from the position of climate 
leader. The head of the Japanese delegation at COP 16 in Mexico stated that Japan 
would not be a part of new Kyoto Protocol commitment period. The aim of the 
article is to identify changing factors in decision–making process that led to quick 
change in DPJ’s approach to international climate mitigation efforts.
Keywords: climate negotiations, Japan’s environmental politics, Post–Kyoto Pro-
tocol negotiations, Democratic Party of Japan, Japan’s foreign policy, DPJ decision 
making process
1. Introduction
Japanese diplomacy has actively engaged in climate change negotia-
tions since the late 1980s. In the last 25 years one can observe a diverse 
approach of Japanese administration towards the issue. Japan was one of 
the leading countries in terms of energy efficiency and green assistance to-
wards other countries. A large part of Japanese Official Development Assis-
tance is dedicated to fighting environmental and climate challenges. After 
the initial success of the Kyoto Protocol conference, Japan tried to act as 
a leader in climate negotiations within the United Nations (UN), G8 and 
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other regional organizations. Unfortunately, the Liberal Democratic Party 
administration did not manage to play a  decisive part in global climate 
cooperation. Although many Japanese initiatives received international ap-
preciation and support, its position during negotiations had also attracted 
a substantial amount of criticism coming from international non–govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and European Union (EU) countries opting 
for more decisive actions. The government in Tokyo has consistently resist-
ed committing to ambitious, obligatory Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction 
targets. Despite being a host country of the Kyoto Protocol Conference in 
1997, Japan faced serious problems with establishing effective domestic 
GHG reduction policy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) introduced var-
ious initiatives and legislations in order to meet its Kyoto target, but most 
of the actions were based on voluntary measures (Tiberghien & Shreurs 
2010, p. 142). The lack of effective tools for GHG reduction like carbon 
tax, feed–in tariff mechanism or a working Cap and Trade system were the 
main sources of criticism towards LDP’s climate policy coming from envi-
ronmental NGOs and CO2 reduction supporters.
According to many scholars (Pajon 2010, p. 88; Shreurs & Tiberghien 
2010, p. 162) the situation was likely to change after the Democratic 
Party of Japan came to power in 2009. Advocates of introducing a more 
ambitious climate policy both on the Japanese and international political 
scene expected a major shift in energy and climate policymaking process 
(Fackler 2009). Their expectations seemed to come to fruition after Ha-
toyama Yukio’s Government pledged 25% reduction of CO2 levels during 
the Copenhagen Climate Summit. The window of opportunity for change 
in international and domestic climate policy was very short. Soon after 
the failure of climate negotiations in 2009, the DPJ drastically changed its 
stance towards international climate cooperation and domestic climate 
policy. The aim of this article is to identify the most important reasons for 
this shift and to offer a deeper look into the credibility of environmental 
image that the DPJ created during its election campaign. 
2. Climate Change policy in DPJ Election Campaign
Before election, DPJ leaders voiced their decisive support for strong-
er engagement in international climate negotiations. Okada Katsuya, the 
party’s secretary general, promised that the “embarrassing reduction tar-
gets” presented by the LDP since the beginning of Japanese participation 
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in the UN climate negotiations will be revised. Kan Naoto expressed his 
plans of separating climate and environmental policy from the bureau-
cratic influence of the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry. Their 
ideas found a  place in the DPJ election manifesto which included the 
following promises: 
• reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 25% (from 1990 levels) by 
2020 and by more than 60% by 2050;
• playing a  leading role in international climate negotiations with 
the aim of ensuring participation of major emitter nations like the United 
States and China;
• establishing effective domestic emission trading market;
• looking into the possibility of introducing global warming taxes and 
their effects on the Japanese economy;
• introduction of a fixed–price purchase system for renewable energy 
generated from all power sources;
• subsidies for purchase of solar panels, “green vehicles” and energy 
saving appliances;
• increasing the ratio of renewable energy production to 10% of total 
energy supply;
• promoting R&D and commercialization of environment friendly 
technologies (DPJ Manifesto 2009, p. 23–25). 
One can easily observe that apart from ambitious GHG reduction 
commitment (25% reduction by 2020) and declarations of increasing ef-
forts in international climate negotiations, DPJ politicians planned to 
pursue new policies and measures to reach their climate goals, including 
serious changes in domestic energy policy.
One of the most important DPJ election promises was to adopt 
a comprehensive feed–in tariff mechanism for all renewable energy sourc-
es including wind and geothermal facilities. Feed–in tariffs are one of the 
most effective tools of increasing the use of renewable energy in which 
the government offers to buy the energy produced from renewable sourc-
es at a profitable rate. The new system was supposed to serve as an ex-
pansion of feed–in tariff introduced in November 2009. LDP legislation 
drafted mostly by METI provided limited financial incentives for compa-
nies producing energy using only solar power. The main difference in the 
DPJ promise was the idea of buying all renewable energy produced by the 
providers (not only surplus power) (Iida & DeWit 2011, p. 6). Another 
important declaration was the plan to increase domestic production of 
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renewable energy up to 10% of total energy supply by 2020. This proposi-
tion stood in sharp contrast with previous governmental policy in which 
renewable sources contributed only to 1.6% of Japan’s energy production 
in 2014. According to Iida and DeWit (2011, p. 7), compared to other de-
veloped countries like Germany (45% by 2030), Scotland (80% by 2020) 
or even China (16% by 2020) Japanese goal of increasing power generation 
from renewables was one of the lowest. Ambitious international decla-
rations and changes in domestic energy policy were aimed at increasing 
Japanese competitiveness on the global energy and climate technology 
market. Hatoyama Yukio as well as other DPJ politicians stressed that 
investment in renewable energy and climate friendly technology is one 
of the ways to deal with Japanese energy security problems and to boost 
economic growth and exports (Iida & DeWit 2011, p. 7).
The DPJ tried to present a consistent climate and environment friend-
ly image standing in opposition to previous LDP actions. The new climate 
approach can be interpreted through a broader strategy of distancing pol-
itics from Keidanren and an attempt to limit the influence of Japanese 
bureaucracy on the decision–making process. Many DPJ politicians have 
strong connections with environmental groups (Tiberghien & Shreurs 
2010, p. 143). Even more interesting is the fact that both Okada Kat-
suya (Minister) and Fukuyama Tetsurō (Vice Minister) who have strong 
ties with environmental NGOs, worked as the heads of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs after the election. Some of the DPJ declarations, like the 
25% GHG reduction target, were perceived as unrealistic and impossible 
to introduce by the Japanese industry and entire power generation sector. 
One needs to take into account that many DPJ members were former 
LDP politicians who were familiar with the policymaking process and the 
effects they can have on the entire Japanese economy. The question that 
arises, is why they had not opposed those overly ambitious propositions 
before the DPJ manifesto was created.
3. The DPJ Position in Copenhagen
Soon after the elections one could observe that the newly elected gov-
ernment was seriously interested in taking a  lead during the upcoming 
UN climate summit in Copenhagen. 2009 was supposed to bring a break-
through in international climate talks. After years of intensive dialogue 
within the UN and G8, the world’s biggest economies intended to sign 
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a new global climate agreement which would replace the Kyoto Protocol. 
Voices coming from the public as well as countries vitally interested in 
strengthening climate cooperation were full of hope and high expecta-
tions of the upcoming summit. Conditions for reaching an agreement 
became even more favorable after Barrack Obama was elected as the new 
president of the United States. During his election campaign he frequent-
ly underlined the negative consequences of Washington’s weak participa-
tion in international climate and environmental regime (Obama 2008). 
Those declarations pointed at the possibility of bringing back the United 
States to close climate cooperation within the UN after President George 
W. Bush decided to abandon the Kyoto Protocol.
Talks in Copenhagen began in the atmosphere of global enthusiasm 
and high expectations of signing a new global climate deal. Nearly 10,500 
delegates from 120 countries participated in the summit. With them came 
more than 3,000 representatives of global media (UNFCCC 2009b). Un-
fortunately, the high expectations of the international community were 
not met after the conclusion of Copenhagen summit. The negotiations 
were slower and more difficult than expected. Only after the United States 
and China exerted strong pressure, the participating countries agreed to 
sign a  document called the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCC 2009a). The 
new agreement was soon criticized by international NGOs and deemed 
as ineffective and insufficient for reaching long term reduction goals. The 
accord did not include binding CO2 reduction targets nor emission caps. 
Developed and developing economies did not reach a final agreement con-
cerning the financial aid for climate mitigation processes (den Elzen, An-
dries, Mendoza, 2009, p. 29). The deal consisted of relatively ambitious 
declarations of developed countries concerning future actions towards 
reducing CO2 emissions by the year 2020. The United States pledged 
a 17% reduction compared to 2005 emission levels. The EU promised 
reduction ranging from 20 to 30% compared to 1990 levels. One of the 
biggest successes during the conference was ensuring declarations coming 
from developed BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) coun-
tries. Chinese delegates promised a 40% reduction of CO2 emissions per 
GDP unit by 2020 as well as increasing renewable energy production up 
to 15% of the country’s total supply (UNFCCC 2009d). India agreed to 
a 25% reduction per GDP unit by 2020 (UNFCCC 2009e). Brazil pledged 
a 36–39% reduction and South Africa 34%, provided that they receive fi-
nancial and technological support (den Elzen, Andries & Mendoza 2009, 
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p. 30). One has to note that all declarations were voluntary and not legally 
binding. Many of them included additional conditions and assumptions. 
Therefore, it is difficult to predict the real effect that they will have on 
global climate mitigation process (Morgan 2009). 
One of the most ambitious declarations came from the new prime 
minister of Japan, Hatoyama Yukio, who promised a 25% reduction com-
pared with 1990, providing that other major emitters would participate 
in global climate mitigation mechanisms (UNCCC 2009c). The pledge 
came as a surprise for the international community as well as domestic 
business groups and opposition parties. The previous administration led 
by Asō Tarō offered a  15% reduction based on 2005 levels. Since CO2 
emissions in Japan had substantially grown from 1990 to 2005, changing 
the baseline meant that the reduction offered by the last LDP government 
was not very ambitious. Opinion polls conducted across Japan showed 
that nearly 70% of respondents favored the idea of a 4% reduction from 
2005 levels, due to similar declarations coming from EU countries and 
the United States (Michaelowa 2010, p. 7). One of the most distinct opin-
ions discovered in the questionnaires was the strong conviction that Japan 
should not support a  stronger reduction target than the United States 
and EU, since it is not beneficial for the Japanese economy. During the 
G8 summit in Toyako in 2008, it became clear that the pledge of a 15% 
reduction from 2005 levels was not sufficient to play a  leading part in 
the negotiations. The LDP’s failure to exert stronger influence during the 
Toyako Summit convinced the newly elected DPJ government to propose 
a much more ambitious target in Copenhagen in order to gain the upper 
hand at the negotiating table. What is more, the polls conducted just after 
the 2009 election showed that nearly 75% of respondents supported the 
DPJ’s plan of ambitious CO2 reduction. One should ask the question why 
Japanese society opposed a stronger reduction mechanisms proposed by 
the LDP and just after few months was eager to support an even more 
ambitious plan presented by the DPJ. According to Kiyoaki Aburaki, the 
great disparity between the poll results stems from the fact that the Ha-
toyama Administration did not provide information about the costs of 
their reduction plans. On the opposite, the LDP government included 
estimated costs that each Japanese household would have to pay for CO2 
reduction (Aburaki 2010, p. 7). In the end, favorable poll results as well 
as Hatoyama’s aspirations to play a leading role at Copenhagen convinced 
the DPJ administration to push through the controversial 25% reduction 
121DPJ Government and Climate Change Policy 
target. DPJ leaders had to live up to ambitious climate promises included 
in the election manifesto (Peng Er 2009, p. 70). One should also not forget 
about the important role of Okada Katsuya, the DPJ’s secretary general, 
who acted as a strong advocate of ambitious climate policy. Together with 
other representatives of the environmentalist camp he was responsible 
for shaping the fundaments of DPJ’s climate policy (Aburaki 2010, p. 7).
Another important result of the Copenhagen conference was estab-
lishing a 30 billion USD fund for climate mitigation projects in develop-
ing countries. Japan pledged 11 billion USD, the EU 10.6 billion USD 
and the United States 3.6 billion (Michaelova 2010, p. 2). The accord 
contained one of the highest aid pledges in the history of negotiations. 
Nevertheless, it received a lot of criticism from some developing nations 
which claimed the amount was insufficient (Vidal 2010). Apart from se-
rious developments and ambitious pledges, the accord was not perceived 
as a satisfactory tool for solving long term climate goals. The parties did 
not reach agreement on pursuing goals included in the 2007 Bali Action 
Plan, therefore the negotiations did not pave a way for the post–Kyoto 
cooperation period. 
Japanese environment minister Ozawa Sakihito made a positive com-
ment after the accord had been signed as it was “noticed” by the greatest 
CO2 emitters. He also urged other countries with substantial emissions to 
propose new reduction targets (Fujioka, Kubota & Norton, 2010). Mitarai 
Fujio, chairman of Nippon Keidanren, said that the conference managed 
to create a  path that all other countries were likely to follow (Aburaki 
2010, p. 14). Despite making one of the most ambitious reduction pledg-
es, Tokyo delegation was not able to play decisive role during negotiations. 
Japan did not manage to convince other participants to accept its ideas 
towards future climate cooperation. The Japanese reduction plan did not 
change the position of the United States and China which offered much 
lower targets. The accord did not include long term reduction targets 
aimed at year 2050 which was one of Japan’s propositions (Rogelj, Chen 
& Nabel 2010, p. 2). Negotiations in Copenhagen clearly showed that 
Japan, which was responsible for merely 4% of global CO2 emissions, re-
mained in the shadow of major emitters like China and the United States. 
The 15th Conference of Parties once again turned out to be a  scene of 
conflict between developing and developed countries. For a very long time 
China and India were blocking negotiation progress. It was the influence 
of the United States, not Japan’s, that led to finalizing the talks. Prime 
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Minister Hatoyama was criticized by Japanese media for his lack of polit-
ical foresight. Minister of the Environment Ozawa Sakihito reached the 
conclusion that UN climate negotiations, where decisions were reached 
almost unanimously, were a difficult forum to promote stronger climate 
cooperation (Aburaki 2010, p. 16). Ozawa’s view is similar to the opinion 
among many politicians involved in the climate and energy decision–mak-
ing process in Japan. The negative experience of the Copenhagen summit 
as well as previous failures to play a leading role in international climate 
regime led to a deep disillusionment with the idea of establishing a global, 
binding GHG reduction agreement.
4. Domestic Opposition to Hatoyama’s Initiative
Hatoyama’s initiative received a huge amount of criticism from oppo-
sition parties, representatives of METI and Japanese business. Although 
the party’s Secretary General Okada had informed Nippon Keidanren 
about the DPJ’s ambitious CO2 targets, information about the official 
25% reduction pledge in Copenhagen caused a storm among business and 
industrial circles (Aburaki 2010, p. 12). It was also heavily criticized by 
part of the Japanese bureaucracy. According to Akira Sawa from METI, 
the new GHG reduction plan could not be implemented since it was not 
a  subject to any kind of inter–ministerial or public consultations. He 
also claimed that Hatoyama’s initiative was unrealistic since Japan had 
already faced serious problems with fulfilling the Kyoto Protocol target 
(Sawa 2009, p. 2). The only way to undermine the prime minister’s dec-
laration was by undermining the condition of equal participation of the 
international community. The DPJ’s plan would only go into effect if oth-
er major emitters like China, the United States and India also participat-
ed in climate mitigation to a similar extent. Nippon Keidanren claimed 
that the government should conduct a thorough research on the influence 
that Hatoyama’s initiative would have on the Japanese economy, before 
committing to any kind of reduction. Representatives of Japan’s biggest 
corporations called for launching an open public debate on equal climate 
protection responsibilities among developed economies (Aburaki 2010, 
p. 12). Keidanren representatives openly voiced their concerns that Japan 
might end up paying the highest price for CO2 reduction, since the Co-
penhagen Accord did not guarantee equal shares of burden and responsi-
bilities on a global scale. This position received support from the Japanese 
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Trade Union Confederation, which provided strong support for the DPJ in 
the 2009 election (Aburaki 2010, p. 13).
Despite strong opposition from business circles and Japanese bureau-
cracy, the Hatoyama Government launched a national debate on the best 
means to achieve a 25% GHG reduction. The first initiatives discussed 
were the Cap and Trade emission trading system and global warming tax. 
Both tools had attracted a lot of criticism. The Japan Iron and Steel As-
sociation pointed out that domestic steel industry had very limited pos-
sibilities of introducing further emission cuts since it already was one of 
the most energy efficient in the world. Introducing the Cap and Trade 
system would force the Japanese government to buy additional emission 
permits from other countries (Aburaki 2010, p. 14). According to Nippon 
Keidanren, a new climate tax could have a negative influence on the Jap-
anese economy. During the debate, organization representatives tried to 
convince public opinion that Japan did not need to resort to additional 
reduction mechanisms, since it managed to achieve Kyoto Protocol targets 
thanks to voluntary methods (Aburaki 2010, p. 14).
After the election, DPJ leaders believed that it was possible to ini-
tiate effective changes in Japanese energy policy and to alter the entire 
decision–making process. Their first moves were aimed at reducing the 
authority of bureaucrats, especially from the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry and business circles. It did not take long for party leaders to 
realize that introducing effective changes without the support from Kasu-
migaseki would not be as easy as initially believed. What is more, the DPJ 
consisted of many representatives of Japanese Trade Unions, former LDP 
members and politicians representing strong connections with business 
circles and bureaucracy. Thanks to those connections interest groups were 
able to use institutional resources and policymaking limitations to pre-
vent a major transformation of Japanese energy and climate policy (Iida & 
DeWit 2011, p. 8). 
The first obstacles that prevented the Hatoyama Administration from 
initiating reforms in energy policy were a  lack of experienced staff and 
inadequate personnel in advisory committees and other governmental 
institutions. In order to avoid conflict between the ministries, the DPJ 
created a committee of cabinet members responsible for new climate pol-
icy. In October 2009 a new body formed a special task force responsible 
for identifying the best mechanisms for reaching a 25% reduction target 
(Iida & DeWit 2011, p. 8). Many experts in this task force had strong 
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connections with METI bureaucrats. The task force experts decided to 
base their discussion on the same projections and CO2 reduction cost 
estimation data compiled by METI for the previous LDP administration. 
According to Iida and DeWit, using the same data was unrealistic, since 
it did not take into account changes in the Japanese economy and global 
climate technology market that took place in the decade of the 2000s. 
What is more, the LDP compiled this data using statistical models that 
emphasized the large costs of CO2 reduction (2011, p. 8). Among person-
nel appointed to the new task force was a group of bureaucrats with strong 
connections to METI working in the Cabinet Secretariat in the Office of 
the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary. This office, which was supposed to 
provide assistance to cabinet members, had not been dismantled after the 
election. Most of the officials in this body were part of the bureaucratic 
camp that for a very long time opposed the Kyoto Protocol and any kind of 
CO2 reduction policies (Iida & DeWit 2011, p. 8).
According to Aburaki, one of the main difficulties in developing an 
efficient and coherent climate protection policy by the Hatoyama Ad-
ministration was lack of consensus among key politicians and groups 
of interest. Signs of a strong internal conflict between the DPJ adminis-
tration on one side and bureaucracy and business groups on the other, 
became clear after Hatoyama tried to pass the Global Warming Bill in 
2010. New legislation was supposed to regulate essential instruments in 
Hatoyama’s climate policy like an emission trading system, climate tax 
and measures to introduce a 25% GHG reduction. Since the special task 
force responsible for compiling a roadmap for CO2 reduction turned out 
to be ineffective, the task was given to the central environmental council 
run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Iida & DeWit 2011, p. 9). In order 
to prevent Ministry of the Environment from introducing major changes 
in energy policy and protect vested interests, METI bureaucrats started 
to work on their own project of the bill. Both documents were presented 
to the cabinet in June 2010. Among all the tools of GHG reduction the 
Cap and Trade system received the biggest amount of criticism com-
ing from METI and business groups. Out of 64 companies asked about 
their opinion on the mechanism, 61 opposed it and claimed it could be 
harmful for their competitiveness (Iida & DeWit 2011, p. 10). Another 
important promise before the election was the introduction of a feed–in 
tariff mechanism. In this case METI–related bureaucrats also managed 
to gain support in the working committee for feed–in tariff revision. 
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Strong opposition from the Japanese industry supported by METI be-
came a major obstacle in the works related to the global warming bill. In 
the end, DPJ politicians associated with METI managed to substantially 
change the draft of the bill to postpone the introduction of CO2 reduc-
tion mechanisms.
The bill was heavily criticized by the LDP as it did not provide any 
details on how those new instruments were supposed to work, what effect 
they should have on the Japanese economy and when would they be in-
troduced. According to Prime Minister Hatoyama, the bill served as a con-
firmation of international pledges his government made in Copenhagen. 
The LDP was joined in its criticism by representatives of industrial circles 
and trade unions who accused the government of acting against Japanese 
economic interests without giving any tangible reasons to do so. Lower 
reduction targets in China and the United States may bring great losses 
for Japan’s economy (Aburaki 2010, p. 18). At the beginning of June 2010, 
Hatoyama Yukio resigned and was replaced by Prime Minister Kan Naoto. 
In order to sum up Hatoyama’s climate effects one has to notice that apart 
from making ambitious declarations in Copenhagen, his cabinet failed 
to introduce a single effective mechanism that could lead to real GHG 
reduction in the long term.
5. Kan Naoto and Change in Climate Policy 
Direction
After diplomatic failure in Copenhagen one can observe the change in 
attitude of DPJ leaders towards climate negotiations. Despite making one 
of the most ambitious reduction commitments, Japanese representatives 
were not able to influence other parties. If one can agree that in spite of 
bold intentions the Hatoyama government failed to implement the am-
bitious measures, the next prime minister, Kan Naoto, tried to distance 
himself and his cabinet from the discussion on international and domes-
tic climate policy. This shift became evident soon after the next climate 
summit in Cancún, Mexico in December 2010 where Japanese delegation 
refused to support the project of extending the Kyoto Protocol (Feldman 
2010). Arima Jun from METI, who acted as the head of the Japanese del-
egation, stated that “our country would not inscribe its greenhouse gas 
emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol on any conditions or under 
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any circumstances” (Environmental News Service 2010). His statement 
was immediately picked up by representatives of the global media who 
understood it was abandoning not only the Kyoto Protocol but also other 
climate promises. One should note that Kan’s government did not re-
fuse to fulfill its obligation from the first phase of Kyoto Protocol nor did 
it reject Hatoyama’s pledge of a  25% reduction. Nevertheless, Arima’s 
statement came as a shock to other representatives participating in the 
conference in Cancún. Delegates from 20 countries led by Mexico, host 
of the conference, tried to convince Prime Minister Kan to change his po-
sition. His refusal to extend the agreement stood in a sharp contrast with 
the policy of his predecessors that for a very long time centered around the 
Kyoto Protocol, one of the first important climate agreements and a sym-
bol of Japanese ambitions to lead global climate negotiations (Tiberghien 
& Shreurs 2007, p. 71). 
According to Iida and DeWit, Arima’s statement should be perceived 
as going back on election promises in which the DPJ underlined the im-
portance of environmental policy as a foundation for Japan’s sustainable 
growth. In their article titled “The ‘Power Elite’ and Environmental–En-
ergy Policy in Japan” they claim that refusal to participate in the next 
phase of the Kyoto Protocol was a  turning point in the entire climate 
policy promoted by Prime Minister Hatoyama (2011, p. 1). Scholars be-
lieve that Kan’s decision to back out of UN climate negotiations was not 
surprising when one takes into account the overall objective of interest 
groups involved in Japanese energy policy. Kan Naoto was backtracking 
from almost all the climate and environmental promises that the DPJ 
made after it gained power (2011, p. 1). Soon after he assumed office 
his cabinet stopped working on the emission trading system, postponed 
the project of increasing the rate of renewable energy and refused to 
provide any details on the perspective of introducing a complex feed–in 
tariff mechanism. The authors claim that this 180–degree shift in in-
ternational climate negotiations as well as freezing the progress of do-
mestic reforms was not a result of objective cost and benefit analysis, 
but merely an attempt to protect particular, vested interests in Japanese 
energy sector (2011, p. 2). One can look at Kan’s sudden lack of inter-
est in climate policy as an attempt to partially reconcile with Japanese 
bureaucracy and other interest groups in order to gain their support for 
other policies.
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6. Conclusion
One of the most influential groups of interest trying to prevent major 
changes in Japanese climate and energy policy are big energy companies, 
which try to protect their domination on the energy market and prevent 
smaller energy providers from entering it. The other group consists of the 
biggest Japanese companies working in the metal and cement industry 
and other branches of the economy. Those companies refuse to accept 
any kind of regulation that may increase their production costs. The last 
but probably the most influential group are Japanese bureaucrats, mostly 
from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry which plays a role of 
a watchdog and protects the interests of Japanese business (Iida & DeWit 
2011, p. 2). 
Iida, DeWit and Aburaki agree that one of the main reasons for the 
DPJ’s inability and later unwillingness to introduce coherent and effective 
climate policy was the strong opposition from Japanese bureaucrats and 
other interest groups. Soon after assuming power, DPJ leaders including 
Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto had to realize that it was extremely dif-
ficult to introduce permanent changes in energy policy without the full 
support of the ministries and key business players. Although Hatoyama 
tried to cut off bureaucrats from the decision–making process they still 
managed to paralyze the DPJ’s reform attempts. Especially in the case 
of energy and climate policy a large part of the personnel, structure and 
working system of advisory committees, as well as research and analysis 
methods were left unchanged. It is difficult to build a new policy using the 
same tools and methods. 
Another reason for the DPJ’s failure at introducing changes in the old 
system of vested interests was the lack of unity within the party. The DPJ 
was formed from the cooperation of smaller opposition parties and a large 
group of LDP politicians led by Ozawa Ichirō. Many of those politicians 
retained their connections with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and In-
dustry, Japanese Trade Unions and business representatives. In difficult 
situations some of them became the agents of vested interests that tried 
to control the direction of DPJ policies. Differences in party organization 
and a  lack of a firm and organized decision–making process within the 
party was one of the reasons that ambitious climate declarations were in-
serted into the DPJ election manifesto in the first place. Groups of interest 
and Japanese bureaucracy did not have much control over the Manifesto 
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formulation process. The manifesto did not undergo the process of in-
ter–party debate but was rather a list of ideas of the most important DPJ 
leaders which was supposed to put as much distance between the Demo-
crats and their LDP rivals. Only later it became apparent that it was not 
easy to introduce ideas that stand in complete opposition to the political 
system which had been dominated by the vested interests for a very long 
time. The part of the Manifesto devoted to climate and energy policy was 
formulated mostly by Okada Katsuya and his closest associates who actu-
ally believed in the necessity of changing the petrified system dominated 
by large companies and bureaucrats. Unfortunately, the window of op-
portunity for transformation was very short. The next such window was 
probably opened only after Fukushima crisis turned the entire national 
energy strategy upside down.
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